A very good article on ‘Consciousness Explained’ provides an opportunity to revisit Daniel Dennett’s theory, which was very popular when it was first published. It’s a 35-year-old work marred by numerous shortcomings that make it outdated. Here’s why:
Our “illusions” about consciousness
Dennett… denounces the idea that consciousness corresponds to a “central organ” in the brain (the “Cartesian theater”). He sees it as a decentralized system in which multiple versions of reality compete. The unified consciousness, at any given moment, would be the dominant version.
My comment: There is no incompatibility between the two views. On the contrary, the Cartesian theater and the decentralized system are both necessary concepts for explaining our conscious experience. They are not opposed. They are the global and constitutive aspects of the same system. The conscious network is decentralized but does indeed generate a unified consciousness. By what curious mechanism would we only experience the dominant version of reality and not the others? Dennett reintroduces the “homunculus” he wants to get rid of, a kind of Maxwellian demon that would sift through our neural productions, letting only one through.
Qualia
Dennett… dismantles the concept of qualia, reducing it to an illusion created by neural processes.
My comment: Trapped in his flattened view of mental complexity, Dennett, like other reductionists, is forced to denigrate the existence of qualia, having no explanation to offer. Calling them an illusion is in no way an explanation. An illusion for what, for whom? Here again, Dennett subtly reintroduces a homunculus, a receptacle of “illusion.” Whereas, by decoupling conscious globality from its constitution, this globality naturally becomes the seat of the fusional experience called “qualia,” without the need to resort to illusion.
The Self
Dennett… sees thought emerging as a “celebrity” within the neural network. The sequence of these thoughts forms a story, and this dominant temporal narrative is the true definition of the Self. Thus there is no centralization of personal identity.
My comment: Again, for whom does one thought become more famous than another? Dennett’s theory in no way makes the brain autonomous. It is dualistic, separating the brain that tells the story on one side from something that listens to it on the other. This creates two “Selves.” One too many. Because our conscious experience is unique, corresponding neither to a narrative nor to its reception. We now know that neural networks don’t tell a story; they are organized graphs that seek themselves out in reality, strengthen by recognizing themselves there, and disintegrate when they are absent. They are the thread of identity. But not a linear or horizontal thread. These are layers of history, of increasing complexity as new criteria enrich it from birth.
My conclusion
What, then, is consciousness, in truth? The pinnacle of this complexity. The higher workspace, which gradually rises as complexity deepens. The self is like an onion, its scales growing around it. Conscious experience constitutes the global face of this complexity. To avoid reintroducing a new dualism, I hypothesize that this globality, concretely, is the configuration of probabilities for each of the possible arrangements of neural graphs —the competing views of reality evoked by Dennett. This configuration is stable and determinate, unlike its constitution, which is not —all arrangements exist within the constitution, which therefore remains indeterminate.
This concept is difficult to grasp for those unfamiliar with quantum mechanics. Its appeal lies in its applicability to any complex phenomenon, from subatomic interactions onward. But this isn’t about magically conjuring up a “quantum consciousness.” The reason our consciousness is such a rich phenomenon is due to the sheer number of layers of complexity built up by neural graphs and their interconnections at multiple levels (re-entries).
*